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INTRODUCTION 
Ronald Dworkin‟s forthcoming book, Justice for Hedgehogs,1 is a work of 
breathtaking scope.  My task is theoretically limited to appraising the few 
pages of the manuscript devoted to his account of international human rights.  
Yet Dworkin has written more extensively about human rights elsewhere;2 and 
given his ambition to defend the unity and objectivity of value, it would be 
misguided to appraise his account of human rights in isolation – divorced from 
what he has to say elsewhere in the manuscript about issues such as ethics, 
morality, objectivity, and value pluralism.  Needless to say, I will not try to 
respond in depth to the arguments in each of these tangential areas and often 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Visiting Associate 
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  I acknowledge with gratitude the 
insightful critiques and suggestions of Gabriella Blum, Eric Blumenson, Daniel M. 
Bodansky, Harlan G. Cohen, Gary Lawson, David B. Lyons, W. Michael Reisman, Kenneth 
W. Simons, and the participants in the Boston University Symposium on Justice for 
Hedgehogs, including Professor Dworkin, and in the University of Georgia Law School‟s 
International Law Colloquium.  Errors are mine.  Comments welcome: rdsloane@bu.edu. 
1 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010) (Apr. 17, 2009 
manuscript on file with the Boston University Law Review). 
2 See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? 24-51 (2006) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY]. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1537263
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can only indicate my affirmative views briefly or by reference.  But Dworkin‟s 
account of human rights cannot be understood, still less meaningfully 
scrutinized, in isolation from the theoretical context in which he situates it.  
That account, in my judgment, captures much that is both laudable and 
defensible in the liberal political tradition out of which the postwar 
international human rights movement developed.3  But especially insofar as the 
manuscript aspires to provide objective moral foundations for international 
human rights, it strikes me as misguided – perhaps even counterproductive – in 
at least five ways. 
First, the account of human rights in Justice for Hedgehogs is vague.  It fails 
to offer much, if any, guidance relative to many of the most difficult concrete 
issues that arise in the field of human rights law and policy – that is, in 
precisely those circumstances in which international lawyers might benefit 
from the sort of guidance that moral foundations supposedly promise.4  It is 
also troubling, and puzzling, given Dworkin‟s well-known commitment to the 
“right answer” thesis,5 that the account of international human rights in Justice 
for Hedgehogs renders answers to hard moral and legal questions about those 
rights necessarily indeterminate, not only in practice (that is, because of our 
cognitive or other epistemic limits) but also conceptually. 
Second, conceptions of human rights justified by avowedly objective moral 
foundations invariably prove inherently controversial and therefore divisive in 
practice.  The account of human rights in Justice for Hedgehogs is no 
exception.  In part for this reason, it is ill-suited to a global order that is 
characterized, at least empirically, by pluralism at multiple levels: cultural, 
political, legal, and moral.  Dworkin characterizes his account of human 
dignity as secular and ecumenical, but in fact it seems to rely on the same kind 
of theological or dogmatic assertion that he disavows and critiques (correctly, 
in my view) elsewhere in the manuscript, viz., the “familiar and popular claim 
that human beings have intrinsic and equal worth.”6 
Third, and relatedly, I believe it is a methodological mistake – and at any 
rate, unproductive in practice – to try to derive international human rights, as 
Justice for Hedgehogs does, from an antecedent conception of human dignity 
(rather than vice versa).  For a chief virtue of the idea of human rights is that it 
avoids foundational moral claims about the inherent nature of human beings.  
Human rights can best be understood as political and moral posits, which is 
emphatically not to say merely posits.  Together, these posits define a 
particular normative vision of mankind‟s moral nature and potential.  Since 
 
3 See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1-5 (1990). 
4 See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 20-21 (2d 
ed. 2003). 
5 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119, 144-45 (1985). 
6 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1, (manuscript at 129) (emphasis 
added). 
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World War II, the human rights movement has sought, as a progressive social, 
legal, and political project, to instantiate that vision both within states and 
internationally.7  The normative vision of man‟s moral nature and potential that 
is constructed by international human rights is neither arbitrary nor merely 
conventional.8  It draws upon, among other things, history, prudence, the best 
current scientific understanding of human nature, and the phenomenology of 
human experience.  But it is international human rights, which, in combination, 
(aspire to) constitute a particular political conception of human dignity; they do 
not, properly conceived, derive from an antecedent and ostensibly objective 
conception of human dignity (metaphysical, interpretive, or otherwise).9  
Fourth, in the realm of international human rights, the value monism 
advanced in Justice for Hedgehogs is neither persuasive nor practicable.  
Whatever should be said about value pluralism as an interpretive thesis, what 
matters to the universality and normative force of human rights in law and 
practice, is the empirical fact of value pluralism, which Dworkin has 
recognized explicitly in other work.10  A functional and helpful account of 
international human rights must also recognize it.  
Finally, inasmuch as Justice for Hedgehogs aspires to show that all values, 
properly construed, fit together in a coherent, reconcilable, and integrated 
whole, it is incongruous and anachronistic for the manuscript to conceptualize 
sovereignty as in conflict with human rights, such that human rights, at times, 
“trump” sovereignty.11  Many contemporary international lawyers would 
argue, to the contrary, that the best conception of sovereignty in the modern era 
is not opposed to, but rooted in, respect for human rights.  
I conclude by suggesting why, despite these objections, the account of 
human rights in Justice for Hedgehogs to some extent resonates with our 
intuitions – because they are our intuitions, that is, those of twenty-first 
century political liberals in the generic (not partisan) sense.  I have argued in 
past work that, given the structure and political dynamics of the contemporary 
international legal order, a normatively universal conception of human rights, 
which can be justified in terms of the tenets of contemporary political 
liberalism, is the peculiarly appropriate functional concept to govern how 
 
7 See DONNELLY, supra note 4, at 16 (“The essential point is that „human nature‟ is seen 
as a moral posit, rather than a fact of „nature,‟ and a social project rooted in the 
implementation of human rights.  It is a combination of „natural,‟ social, historical, and 
moral elements, conditioned, but not simply determined, by objective historical processes 
that it simultaneously helps to shape.”); Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Idolatry, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 53 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001). 
8 See DONNELLY, supra note 4, at 21. 
9 See id. at 18-21. 
10 See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 76-78 (2006).  For further discussion, see 
infra text accompanying notes 126-163. 
11 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 211) (“Human 
rights . . . do not merely trump collective goals.  They also trump another principle 
prominent in international law: sovereignty.”). 
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states and cognate collective entities must treat people within their power.12  
But that justification, unsurprisingly, depends on the normative force of 
traditional liberal views: skepticism about objective truth in value (or at least 
our epistemic access to it); a political, not ontological, conception of the self as 
an agent; and a legal framework that guarantees citizens the optimal level of 
informed autonomy consistent with the needs of the polity, so that they may 
reconsider and, if warranted, revise even their most deeply held beliefs in the 
light of new argument and evidence.13  
Insofar as Dworkin‟s account of international human rights conforms to our 
intuitions, it is because the two principles of dignity that he expounds in 
Justice for Hedgehogs capture core premises of contemporary political 
liberalism, including – the book‟s title notwithstanding – the fact of value 
pluralism.  For reasons beyond the scope of this Essay, I do not find the 
philosophical defense of objectivity in the realm of value in Justice for 
Hedgehogs persuasive.14  But the point of emphasis is that an equally if not 
more compelling defense of human rights need not rely on unclear and 
inherently controversial claims about the objectivity of “our” values.  It is more 
plausible and constructive, as Michael Ignatieff has argued, “to build support 
for human rights on the basis of what such rights actually do for human 
beings.”15 
I. FOUNDATIONALISM: CLARITY AND CONTROVERSY 
Analytically, the universal normative16 validity of human rights can be 
justified in one of two diametrically opposed ways: either by defending or by 
disavowing objective moral foundations for international human rights.  
Justice for Hedgehogs, which builds on and incorporates Dworkin‟s previous 
work in this area,17 clearly situates his explanation in the former category: it 
 
12 See generally Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the 
Universality of International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‟L L. 527 (2001). 
13 See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 81-82 (1995). 
14 I remain unpersuaded for substantially the reasons explained in BRIAN LEITER, 
Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 225 (2007).  I 
agree, in particular, with what Leiter calls the naturalistic conception of objectivity, the view 
that “objectivity in any domain must be understood on the model of the natural sciences, 
whose objects of study are objective in the sense of being „mind-independent‟ and causally 
efficacious (i.e., in making a causal difference to the course of experience).” Id. at 226 
(footnote omitted). 
15 Ignatieff, supra note 7, at 54. 
16 The assertion that human rights are descriptively universal is false.  See, e.g., 
DONNELLY, supra note 4, at 89 (“Cultural relativity is an undeniable fact; moral rules and 
social institutions evidence an astonishing cultural and historical variability.”); American 
Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AMER. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 
542 (1947). 
17 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 216); see also 
DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 23-51. 
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argues that human rights follow from objective moral foundations.18  I have 
argued in previous work that this kind of justification for human rights is 
misguided, both theoretically and as a strategy to promote the actual protection 
and enjoyment of human rights by human beings.19  I will not reiterate those 
arguments in depth here.  But, briefly, at least two problems afflict efforts to 
supply objective moral foundations for human rights.  Ignatieff captures them 
succinctly in his essay Human Rights as Idolatry: 
It may be tempting to relate the idea of human rights to propositions like 
the following: that human beings have an innate or natural dignity, that 
they have a natural and intrinsic self-worth, that they are sacred.  The 
problem with these propositions is that they are not clear and they are 
controversial.  They are not clear because they confuse what we wish men 
and women to be with what we empirically know them to be. . . .  [T]hey 
are controversial because each version of them must make metaphysical 
claims about human nature that are intrinsically contestable.20 
While I share many of the substantive conclusions Dworkin reaches in Is 
Democracy Possible Here? (“Democracy”) about the extent to which the 
practices adopted by the United States after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 respect 
(or fail to respect) human rights,21 at the theoretical level, I find his 
justification for these conclusions problematic.  The account of human rights in 
Democracy and Justice for Hedgehogs is foundationalist.  Like other such 
accounts, it is, as Ignatieff says, unclear and controversial.  To that extent, I 
think that those who do not already share Dworkin‟s moral, political, and legal 
convictions will be unlikely to find (what I regard as) his substantively sound 
conclusions persuasive.  So even were his conception of human dignity 
objectively true in a philosophically meaningful sense, which I doubt, it might 
nonetheless be misguided – and perhaps even counterproductive – to advance 
it as the appropriate foundation for international human rights. 
A. Clarity: The Nature and Scope of Human Rights 
By human rights, Dworkin means, as many define them,22 “the rights that all 
human beings have just because they are human,”23 even if those rights have 
 
18 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 214-16). 
19 See Sloane, supra note 12, at 558-59, 591 (“Paradoxically, then, the feature of 
comprehensive „conceptions of the good‟ that proves most adverse to an international order 
structured by respect for universal human rights is dogmatic universalism – the claim that 
one system of value prescribes what „is right‟ for everyone and can therefore be justifiably 
imposed, through violence if necessary, on others.”); see also DONNELLY, supra note 4, at 
18-20 (arguing that foundational appeals in the realm of human rights inevitably prove both 
“contingent and contentious”). 
20 Ignatieff, supra note 7, at 54; see also Sloane, supra note 12, at 558-59. 
21 See DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 23-51. 
22 See, e.g., DONNELLY, supra note 4, at 10. 
23 DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 29. 
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not been codified by treaty or otherwise recognized and even if they have been 
mistakenly interpreted.  Justice for Hedgehogs offers, in other words, a moral 
rather than legal account of human rights.  International law might instantiate 
the rights expressed or implied by the account in Justice for Hedgehogs and 
Dworkin‟s earlier work.24  But it would not be a forceful objection to his 
account simply to observe some discrepancies between the human rights 
recognized in positive international law and those expressed or implied in 
Justice for Hedgehogs.  On the other hand, it might well be a forceful objection 
if the account in Justice for Hedgehogs turns out to suggest a list of human 
rights that differs substantially from those that international law recognizes or, 
conversely, that casts doubt on rights that almost everyone regards as 
fundamental.  I will suggest, for the reasons that follow, that this may be the 
case. 
1. What Are Human Rights for Hedgehogs? 
Dworkin‟s account of international human rights, consistent with his 
ambition to defend the unity of value, derives from and reflects the same two 
principles of human dignity that inform his views on ethics, morality, 
responsibility, obligation, and political and legal rights.  The first principle, 
that of self-respect,25 holds that once a human life begins, it is objectively 
important that it go well.  It matters that each human life “be a successful 
performance rather than a wasted opportunity.”26  The second principle, that of 
authenticity,27 holds that each human being “has a special, personal 
responsibility for identifying what counts as success in his own life” and 
therefore must “create that life through a coherent narrative that he has himself 
chosen and endorses.”28  In moral rather than ethical terms, this implies 
constraints on legitimate state coercion, although the scope of those constraints 
remains unclear at such an abstract level.29 
According to Justice for Hedgehogs, the distinction between human rights, 
on the one hand, and political rights, on the other, lies in the degree of 
abstraction appropriate to each.  Within a polity, members of that polity enjoy 
a robust political right “to the best understanding of what the two principles of 
dignity, properly interpreted, in fact require,”30 where “best” means, among 
other things, objectively true and precise.  In contrast, human rights entitle 
 
24 See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 215). 
25 Id. (manuscript at 128).  Dworkin previously called this the principle of intrinsic value.  
DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 9. 
26 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 128). 
27 Id.  Dworkin previously called this the principle of personal responsibility.  DWORKIN, 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 10. 
28 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 128).  
29 DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 21. 
30 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 211) (emphasis 
added). 
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people only to treatment that conforms to a good-faith interpretation of the two 
principles.31  Political elites must therefore treat those in their power “as the 
two principles of dignity require”32 but in a more general sense.  They must 
adopt, in the manuscript‟s words, “an attitude” that is consistent with the two 
principles,33 and presumably they must also try in good faith to respect those 
principles.  To identify a (moral) human right, according to Justice for 
Hedgehogs, we therefore ask only whether a particular act (or omission) is “so 
plainly inconsistent with one or another of the principles of human dignity that 
[it] cannot be understood as expressing a good faith attempt to respect people‟s 
dignity.”34 
2. Hedgehogs and Hard Cases 
The most immediately striking feature of this account of human rights, 
given Dworkin‟s other views as expressed in Justice for Hedgehogs and prior 
work, is that it renders many human rights strongly indeterminate,35 not just as 
a practical matter, for that may be true of political and legal rights too given 
our cognitive and other epistemic limits, but conceptually.  If two officials 
each adopt an attitude consistent with the two principles and try in good faith 
to treat people as they believe the principles require, then both, by hypothesis, 
respect international human rights, even if they reach radically different 
conclusions about the nature or scope of particular rights. 
We can see, or so it seems at first blush,36 why egregious violations of 
human rights would fail this good-faith test.  Dworkin supplies examples: The 
first principle prohibits genocide, torture, and racial discrimination because 
those acts cannot plausibly be thought to reflect a good-faith effort to treat 
people as though it matters equally that their lives go well.37  The second 
principle prohibits violations of the freedoms of speech, association, and 
religion because, absent those freedoms, people would lack the agency that 
they require to exercise their special responsibility to “determine the values 
that define success in their lives.”38  
 
31 Id. (manuscript at 211-12). 
32 Id. (manuscript at 212). 
33 Id. (emphasis removed); see also DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 35. 
34 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 212). 
35 Or perhaps optional, although in that event, the right would not, it seems, qualify as a 
genuine (moral) human right; otherwise, how could it simultaneously be optional?  It would 
need to be express or implicit in any bona fide account of the two principles of human 
dignity Dworkin expounds.  
36 But see infra text accompanying notes 64-75. 
37 See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 212); see also 
DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 36-38. 
38 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 212); see also 
DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 37. 
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But apart from such clear examples, and at times even within them, the two 
principles offer a remarkably thin and vague account of human rights.  The 
conception of human dignity constituted by the two principles renders many 
human rights either questionable (they may not be human rights at all) or 
vague (their nature or scope is unclear).  We may or may not, for example, 
enjoy a human right to health of some sort.39  The human right to freedom of 
expression may or may not guarantee neo-Nazis the right to march through an 
Illinois neighborhood prominently displaying swastikas, where many 
Holocaust survivors reside;40 or of a Danish newspaper to publish cartoons 
caricaturing Islam.41  Nor do the two principles help to strike the right balance 
between potential communal rights (for example, linguistic rights or the right 
of all peoples to self-determination) and traditional civil and political rights.42  
Indeed, it is unclear, according to the account in Justice for Hedgehogs, 
whether certain social, economic, and cultural rights even qualify as genuine 
human rights.  Officials of politically liberal states with a record of respect for 
human rights can and do reasonably differ on these and other contentious 
issues.  So even were they to embrace the two principles of human dignity, 
they might well nonetheless, in good faith, differ about such issues. 
To a certain degree, indeterminacy of this sort is a virtue of Dworkin‟s 
account of human rights.  It is consistent with the generally accepted idea that 
international human rights place limits on states but allow them a non-trivial 
measure of political autonomy within those limits.  Human rights do not, for 
example, require one particular form of democracy, legal system, or 
conception of due process.43  States enjoy, in the phrase coined by the 
European Court of Human Rights and since recognized outside that court‟s 
 
39 An even more controversial example would be the oft-mocked right to “periodic 
holidays with pay,” which appears in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 24, 
G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR].  Plausible arguments based on good-faith interpretations of the two principles of 
human dignity exist both for and against such a right. 
40 See Village of Sokie v. Nat‟l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ill. 1978). 
41 Dworkin has expressly argued that the latter right does exist.  See Ronald Dworkin, 
The Right to Ridicule, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 23, 2006, at 44.  Yet if, as seems clear, a 
good-faith construction of the two principles of human dignity could be advanced that 
would justify the contrary conclusion, then the “right to ridicule” cannot, according to 
Dworkin‟s account, be a (moral) human right. 
42 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 1 (self-determination of 
peoples), 27 (linguistic and religious rights for minorities), Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].  See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 13 (arguing 
that the traditional liberalism, despite its focus on the individual, can and should 
accommodate certain group rights). 
43 Sloane, supra note 12, at 568 (“It is clear, for example, that „due process‟ under 
international human rights law does not demand the Anglo-Saxon „adversarial‟ as opposed 
to the Continental „inquisitorial‟ model, or vice versa.  Functionally equivalent safeguards in 
each system can independently satisfy its requirements.”). 
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treaty framework,44 a “margin of appreciation” within which to implement or 
interpret human rights in ways that may be sensitive or responsive to 
prevailing social, cultural, and other norms within their polities.45  
But the virtue of Dworkin‟s account goes too far; it becomes a vice.  It is not 
just that we may be epistemically unable to answer hard questions about 
human rights (such as the existence vel non of a human right to health or the 
scope of the right to freedom of expression); it is that, according to the theory 
set forth in Justice for Hedgehogs, in the realm of moral human rights, there is 
no right answer to these questions.  Given Dworkin‟s theory of adjudication, it 
follows that, in hard cases, there is also no legal right answer: for once 
decisionmakers46 exhaust the dimension of fit with the relevant institutional 
history, they must decide which of several competing moral principles best 
explains and justifies the right in question.  By hypothesis, however, multiple 
bona fide interpretations of the two principles of human dignity may be 
plausible in this regard.  Some might affirm the right at issue.  Others might 
not.  Still others might affirm it but construe it more or less narrowly or 
broadly.  According to Justice for Hedgehogs, respect for human rights does 
not compel one such interpretation over another, provided only that each 
qualifies as a good-faith interpretation.  Human rights therefore stand out in 
Dworkin‟s theory of jurisprudence as a curious exception to the “right answer” 
thesis. 
Take one concrete example: In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,47 the 
plaintiffs, residents of Peru, brought an action under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(“ATCA”).48  The district court dismissed it for, among other reasons, lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.49  The plaintiffs had alleged that the Southern Peru 
Copper Company (“SPCC”), a U.S. company, had violated their human rights 
to life, health, and sustainable development by “mining, refining, and smelting 
operations,” which had emitted pollutants into the local air and water supply, 
causing them or their decedents to develop lung cancer and other serious 
respiratory diseases.50  Flores raised diverse questions of substance and 
procedure, but as relevant here, it required a federal court to decide whether the 
 
44 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].  
45 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976). 
46 The term “decisionmakers” is preferable to “judges” in this context.  In the field of 
international human rights, institutional actors will more often than not be officials other 
than judges, acting in fora other than courts – for example, a member of the Human Rights 
Committee, reviewing a state‟s report on its compliance with the ICCPR.  
47 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003). 
48 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.”). 
49 See Flores, 414 F.3d at 236-37. 
50 Id. at 235-37. 
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cited rights were, in fact, international human rights and, if so, whether 
SPCC‟s conduct conceivably could have violated them, such that the defense‟s 
motion to dismiss should have been denied.51  After a searching analysis of the 
evidence of state practice and opinio juris (the textbook components of 
custom) on which the Flores plaintiffs relied, the Second Circuit agreed with 
the district court that customary international law did not, at least not in the 
particular factual context of Flores, recognize the rights to life, health, and 
freedom from intranational pollution.52  
As a matter of positive law, especially given the threshold articulated by the 
Supreme Court the following year in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,53 the Second 
Circuit almost surely resolved this motion correctly: the plaintiffs failed to 
adduce adequate evidence to establish that the rights on which they sought to 
rely reflected customary norms “accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms” 
cited in Sosa, in particular, “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”54  But of course, the preceding quoted 
language establishes a standard intended only to delimit the realm of legal, not 
moral, human rights – and only those that a U.S. court should recognize under 
a particular federal statute.  Justice for Hedgehogs aspires to answer a distinct 
question: do the putative rights to life, health, and sustainable development 
qualify, morally, as international human rights, even if the Flores court 
correctly declined to recognize them as actionable under one particular statute 
in one particular legal system?55  To answer that question, we do not consider 
arguable analogies to the international torts mentioned in Blackstone‟s 
Commentaries;56 rather, we ask whether SPCC‟s treatment of the plaintiffs 
must be deemed “so plainly inconsistent with one or another of the two 
principles of human dignity that [it] cannot be understood as expressing a good 
faith attempt to respect people‟s dignity.”57 
Yet the two principles of human dignity offer scant guidance to help answer 
this paramount question.  In the first place, given the account of human rights 
in Justice for Hedgehogs, it is unclear that a non-state actor, such as SPCC, 
 
51 Id. at 254. 
52 Id. at 254-66. 
53 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
54 Id. at 715; see also Flores, 414 F.3d at 242-43. 
55 Cf. DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 29 (“So even if the Bush administration 
were right in its legal opinion that the Geneva Conventions and other treaties technically do 
not apply to the Guantánamo detainees, the moral question would still remain whether our 
policies there and elsewhere do violate the detainees‟ underlying human rights, rights that 
the United States would act immorally, even if not illegally, in violating.”). 
56 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (discussing Blackstone‟s paradigms of international torts to 
help define those international norms that may today give rise to actionable violations of 
human rights under the ATCA). 
57 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 212). 
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even can violate human rights.  Justice for Hedgehogs characterizes human 
rights as continuous with political rights, which it describes, in turn, as “rights 
against some government.”58  The difference, again, is that human rights 
reflect the two principles of human dignity at a far more abstract level.  In 
concrete terms, this tends to yield a conservative and, indeed, anachronistic 
conception of human rights.  In the modern era, international human rights 
abuses no longer require state action (or even color of state law) in every case.  
Contemporary international law recognizes that non-state actors, including 
multinational corporations,59 can violate human rights under certain 
circumstances.60  But it would be strange if the domain of moral human rights 
turned out to be more limited than that of legal human rights – for Justice for 
Hedgehogs describes human, political, and legal rights alike as subsets of the 
omnibus domain of moral rights.  On the other hand, if Dworkin would agree 
that corporate actors such as SPCC can violate human rights under some 
circumstances, does that mean that they, too, must adopt a favorable attitude 
toward, and try in good faith to respect and implement, the two principles of 
human dignity?  Either an affirmative or a negative answer to this question 
seems problematic in some respect. 
A negative answer, as the preceding paragraph suggests, would render 
Dworkin‟s account of human rights underinclusive and anachronistic.  It would 
yield an unduly circumscribed list of human rights, all of which, in order to 
qualify as genuine human rights, must be rights against the state.  But perhaps 
that is not an accurate reading of Justice for Hedgehogs.  The manuscript is 
unclear on this particular point.  It focuses on states but at times refers more 
generically to the human rights obligations of “those with power.”61  In 
context, this seems to be a reference to states and their officials.  But it may 
also be read to refer to cognate collective entities that exercise power over 
human beings.  The trouble with this alternative reading of “those with power” 
is that it creates a converse problem: it makes the realm of human rights 
overinclusive.  Power is an ineluctable and pervasive feature of every society, 
and power dynamics operate at multiple levels within each.  It surely cannot be 
the case that anyone, or any collective entity, with power over human beings, 
just for that reason, has a human rights obligation to treat them according to a 
good-faith conception of the two principles of human dignity. 
To make sense of human rights, we need a limiting principle: the thug who 
steals my car at gunpoint has not violated my human rights; he has perpetrated 
a crime.  But if the state arbitrarily and without compensation confiscates my 
 
58 Id. (manuscript at 210). 
59 See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir. 2007).  See 
generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 Yale L.J. 443 (2001). 
60 Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). 
61 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 212). 
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car, it probably has violated my human rights.62  So how do we characterize 
the situation, in moral or legal terms, in which an “official” of the 
Transdniester Moldovan Republic, an unrecognized but de facto state whose 
economy thrives on trafficking in illicit weapons,63 confiscates the automobile 
of a resident within its power?  The point is that while a plausible account of 
international human rights in the modern era cannot be limited to states alone, 
nor can it extend without limitation to “those with power.”  It must explain 
against whom, or against what collective entities, human rights may be 
asserted – and why. 
Furthermore, if legal rights constitute a subset of moral rights, then, as 
suggested earlier, the class of moral human rights should be larger than that of 
legal human rights.  Yet the opposite is clearly true.  Human rights treaties set 
forth numerous (putative) human rights, and those treaties legally bind the 
states parties to them.  But morally, according to Justice for Hedgehogs, the 
only human rights that states must respect are those that, on any good-faith 
account, constitute a conditio sine qua non of treatment that is consistent with 
the two principles of human dignity – that is, those interpretations of putative 
international human rights in the absence of which a state could not, with 
minimal credibility, claim to be trying to treat its citizens in a way that is 
consistent with the two principles.64  It seems both implausible and 
normatively unattractive for human rights – those rights that we regard as so 
important that every human being must have them just because he or she is a 
human being – to be quite so vague and indeterminate. 
Of course, indeterminacy is a problem that afflicts rights generally.  The 
rights to private property and free speech, stated abstractly, “tell[] us very little 
about how to handle particular problems”65 implicating those rights.  But the 
level of particular problems is where human rights matter.  I wrote in earlier 
work that “[s]hould the discourse of human rights remain in theoretical limbo, 
solely the subject of armchair philosophy, then the very concept of human 
rights law becomes quixotic.”66  By defining human rights to require no more 
than a good-faith interpretation of the principles of human dignity – leaving 
aside, for the moment, the force and coherence of those principles – the 
conception of human rights in Justice for Hedgehogs seems likely to generate 
controversies that will impede the instantiation and enforcement of 
international human rights law. 
The indeterminacy that is implicit in Justice for Hedgehogs‟s good-faith 
conception of human rights also renders international human rights susceptible 
to a form of crude moral relativism that Dworkin critiques elsewhere.  For 
 
62 See Sloane, supra note 12, at 544 n.48 (citation omitted). 
63 See MOISÉS NAÍM, ILLICIT 57-58 (2005). 
64 See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 213). 
65 See Cass Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 731-32 
(1995). 
66 Sloane, supra note 12, at 530. 
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what strikes one official as a good faith effort to implement the two principles 
of human dignity, may strike another as bad faith – or vice versa.  Or it may 
strike another official as an overly broad and generous or, conversely, an 
unduly narrow and restricted, interpretation.  The account of human rights in 
Justice for Hedgehogs therefore not only renders those rights indeterminate in 
hard cases; it also means that, for any putative human right, the only obligation 
that is morally incumbent upon a state is the most restrictive, parsimonious 
interpretation of that right that remains consistent with a good-faith 
interpretation of the two principles.  Simply put, “hedgehogs” have human 
rights to the interpretation of each human right that is identical to the least 
common denominator among plausible good-faith interpretations of the two 
principles of human dignity that could explain that right. 
The good-faith account is problematic in still another respect because of the 
(at least superficial) tension between the two principles.  Consider two fictional 
states: Ruritania and Azania.  Ruritania decides that a good-faith effort to 
respect the principles of dignity requires it to recognize a right to healthcare.  It 
reasons, consistent with the first principle, that a person‟s life goes better, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, if he has reliable, secure access to healthcare.  
Azania, in contrast, decides in good faith that it would be a misguided 
interpretation of the two principles to recognize healthcare as a human right.  It 
reasons, consistent with the second principle, that a right to healthcare would 
require too much compulsory redistribution of people‟s legitimately acquired 
wealth, thereby unduly interfering with their special responsibility to identify 
and pursue what counts for them as success in their lives.  
Perhaps, as Hedgehogs argues, this conflict is only superficial within any 
particular polity.  Members of a polity, after all, enjoy a political right to the 
“best conception” of the two principles of human dignity.67  For Dworkin, 
equality, liberty, and other political values, properly construed, do not, pace 
Isaiah Berlin, conflict.  Rather, by an interpretive process, citizens in a polity 
can and should decide whether and, if so, to what extent, the state must 
guarantee a political right to healthcare, such that it optimally maximizes and 
reconciles the two principles of human dignity in a coherent way.  One might 
say, then, that an appropriately limited political right to healthcare, which 
promotes the first principle, need not unduly interfere with the liberty required 
by the second principle: the latter requires only that people enjoy a degree of 
autonomy over their legitimately acquired wealth that suffices to enable them 
effectively to pursue what they have identified as important in their lives. 
But this suggestion – even were it plausible, which, given the fact of value 
pluralism, I doubt – is unavailable in the realm of human rights as defined in 
Justice for Hedgehogs.  On its account, human, unlike political, rights do not 
require the sort of overarching political reconciliation, whereby all values get 
defined such that they fit together in a coherent, integrated whole, that Justice 
 
67 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 211) (emphasis 
added). 
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for Hedgehogs contends is possible and appropriate within each polity.  Rather, 
so long as the state adopts an attitude consistent with the principles and tries in 
good faith to treat people in accordance with them, it does not violate their 
human rights.  Human, in contrast to political, rights forbid only conduct that is 
“so plainly inconsistent with one or another of the two principles of human 
dignity that [it] cannot be understood as expressing a good faith attempt to 
respect people‟s dignity.”68  Again, in practice, this means that for any 
particular human right, states must (morally) guarantee only the interpretation 
that reflects the least common denominator among the class of bona fide 
interpretations of that right that remain consistent with the two principles of 
human dignity. 
This conclusion is troubling, particularly if Dworkin overestimates how 
much is “plainly inconsistent” with a good-faith effort to respect the two 
principles, as I believe he does.  In Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 
Inc.,69 for example, one panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court‟s judgment that customary international law, as distinct from particular 
treaty obligations, does not bar cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or 
punishment (“CIDT”), at least not clearly enough to meet the standard set forth 
in Sosa.70  The court so held even though two federal district courts within the 
Eleventh Circuit had previously held to the contrary.71  The plaintiffs 
petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the Eleventh Circuit denied.72  But 
Judge Rosemary Barkett appended an informed dissent to the denial of the 
petition, arguing persuasively that customary international law does prohibit 
CIDT at the level required by Sosa to sustain a right of action under the 
ATCA.73  Here again, the point is not who has the better of the argument under 
the Sosa standard; rather, it is that if reasonable decisionmakers can, as the 
federal judges in Aldana and prior cases on point did, disagree in good faith 
about whether certain conduct violates the CIDT prohibition, or whether the 
ban on CIDT even is a human right, then, according to Justice for Hedgehogs, 
it is not (at least not morally).74  The two principles of human dignity do not 
 
68 Id. (manuscript at 212). 
69 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc denied, 452 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(Aldana II). 
70 See id. at 1247 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004)). 
71 Id. at 1247. 
72 Aldana II, 452 F.3d at 1284. 
73 See id. at 1284-88. 
74 Other foreign and regional courts have debated similar issues and reasonably, even if 
controversially, arrived at a variety of conclusions about CIDT.  See, e.g., Ireland v. United 
Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5, 67 (1978) (finding that practices such as wall-
standing, hooding, and sleep and food deprivation “undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and 
degrading treatment, . . . [but] did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and 
cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood”); HCJ 5100/94 Public Comm. Against 
Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2) 1471, 1478 (appraising the legality of the 
“moderate physical pressure” techniques that Israeli interrogators employed).  
  
2010] HUMAN RIGHTS FOR HEDGEHOGS 115 
 
help to resolve the legal debate in Aldana between Judge Barkett, the two 
federal district judges, and the Eleventh Circuit majority.  They tell us that if 
good-faith interpretations of the two principles of human dignity exist to 
support a conclusion one way or the other, as they did in Aldana, then there is 
no human right against CIDT.  That seems doubtful – legally and morally.75  
The preceding analysis suggests, first, that Justice for Hedgehogs offers an 
unclear and minimalist account of human rights in the moral sense – one that 
tends to cast doubt on many basic human rights that contemporary 
international law recognizes; and second, that the good-faith inquiry 
recommended by Justice for Hedgehogs offers little guidance relative to 
concrete questions about the nature or scope of human rights in hard cases.  
B. Controversy: The Anti-Foundationalist Pedigree of Human Rights 
The moral foundationalist account of human rights in Justice for Hedgehogs 
is also problematic because it is inherently controversial.  Notwithstanding the 
manuscript‟s disavowal of “morons,” metaethics, and indeed the very 
coherence of “meta” claims in the realm of value, Dworkin emphatically does 
want to argue that his conception of human rights is objective in some 
philosophically meaningful sense.  Other contributors to this symposium have 
a familiarity with the philosophical literature on point that make them better 
suited than this author to appraise Justice for Hedgehogs‟s account of 
objectivity in the realm of value.  But few, if any, have found that account 
persuasive to date,76 and my concern in this section depends only on that 
empirical fact.  
Dworkin aspires to speak to human rights activists, diplomats, lawyers, 
politicians, and others outside the academy.  To his credit, in my view, he has 
insisted throughout his career that philosophy is not, or should not be, an 
esoteric enterprise reserved for an insular academic elite; it should inform, 
among many other things, our views on adjudication, legislation, and civil 
disobedience.  But if the account of human rights in Justice for Hedgehogs is 
inherently controversial even to political liberals otherwise sympathetic to 
many of Dworkin‟s substantive views (this author among them), then we can 
expect that the peoples of many foreign polities – whose consciousness, 
beliefs, and pyschosocial constitutions have been shaped by very different 
 
75 Of course, given his commitment to objectivity in the realm of values, Dworkin might 
want to say that certain people who deny the existence of a particular human right simply 
misconstrue what the two principles require.  The point of emphasis, however, is that, 
except at the margins where virtually everyone agrees, the principles themselves supply no 
objective means to determine which interpretations should be deemed “reasonable” or 
“good-faith” interpretations.  
76 LEITER, supra note 14, at 226 (“Dworkin‟s extensive writings on „external‟ and 
„internal‟ skepticism about objectivity have attracted little attention . . . .  Indeed, I am not 
aware of anyone, other than Dworkin who has found his response on this score 
satisfactory.”). 
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normative environments – will be that much more unlikely to accept those 
views, still less to recognize them as objective.  That is why it strikes me as 
troubling that the principal argument that Justice for Hedgehogs offers for the 
two principles of human dignity, which underwrite human rights and much 
else in Dworkin‟s view, seems to be a form of intuitionism. 
1. Appraising the Two Principles of Human Dignity 
Dworkin does not always express the first principle in the same way.  But to 
paraphrase Is Democracy Possible Here?, a rough formulation of the first 
principle is this: once a human life begins, it is objectively important how that 
life goes.  It matters that a human life, once it starts, go well.77  Justice for 
Hedgehogs says to similar effect that the first principle requires that we 
“recognize the objective importance of [our] living well, of [our lives] being a 
successful rather than a failed response to the challenge of living.”78  As it is 
introduced, the first principle, like the second, is ethical, not moral, as Justice 
for Hedgehogs employs those terms.  That is, the first principle defines what it 
means to live well (ethics), not how we should treat others (morals).  It also 
focuses on a process (living) rather than an entity (human beings). 
Consequently, as a matter of ethics at least, the first principle does not 
advance anything like the usual claim underwriting human rights: that all 
human beings, just because they are human beings (and not in virtue of 
qualities ascribed to them), possess an innate quality in equal measure that 
should properly be characterized as dignity.  In fact, in Justice for Hedgehogs, 
Dworkin seems to be at pains to stress that the first principle, that of self-
respect, “is not . . . the familiar and popular claim that human beings have 
intrinsic and equal worth.”79  He describes that familiar claim – correctly, in 
my view – as implausible or false, depending on what it is supposed to mean.80  
If, he says, it is a claim about the “product value” of human beings – that is, 
“the value it has just as an object independently of the process through which it 
was created or of any other facet of its history”81 – then it is implausible: “The 
world does not go better when there are more human beings in it, as we might 
 
77 DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 9-10 (“[Human life] has value as potentiality; 
once a human life has begun, it matters how it goes.  It is good when that life succeeds and 
its potential is realized and bad when it fails and its potential is wasted.  This is a matter of 
objective, not merely subjective, value; I mean that a human life‟s success or failure is not 
only important to the person whose life it is or only important if and because that is what he 
wants.  The success or failure of any human life is important in itself, something we all have 
reason to want or to deplore.” (first emphasis added; footnote omitted)); see also RONALD 
DWORKIN, LIFE‟S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 74 (1993) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LIFE‟S DOMINION]. 
78 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 129). 
79 Id. (emphasis added). 
80 See id. 
81 Id. (manuscript at 124). 
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well think it does go better when there are more great paintings painted.”82  If 
it is rather a claim about “performance value” – that is, the value that 
something has because of our admiration for the creative process that brought 
it about83 – then it is false: “Many lives have no performance value at all, and 
the performance value of all lives is certainly not equal.”84 
Justice for Hedgehogs thus disavows the familiar claim that all human 
beings have an innate and equal worth.  Yet elsewhere in the manuscript, 
Dworkin describes the first principle – or the two principles in combination, 
which turn out to be moral as well as ethical – in ways that do not so obviously 
differ from that familiar claim.  For the two principles, together, constitute a 
particular conception of human dignity, and it is that conception, rather than 
the two principles, that does the real work in justifying human rights.  A great 
deal therefore depends on both the coherence of the principles, as a matter of 
ethics, and the logical force of the argument that is said to render them 
objective moral principles. 
In Justice for Hedgehogs, as in Dworkin‟s prior work,85 the basic 
syllogism86 behind the first principle is this: First, most of us would concede 
that, subjectively, we believe that our lives, objectively, have intrinsic value; 
and second, we can only make sense of this broadly shared intuition by 
concluding that everyone‟s life, in equal measure, really does – objectively – 
have intrinsic value.87  The derivation of the second principle of human dignity 
 
82 Id. (manuscript at 129).  Parenthetically, while I agree with Dworkin that it is not clear 
why or in what sense human beings have “intrinsic and equal worth,” id., it is not 
necessarily inconsistent to ascribe product value to an object and simultaneously not to want 
more of that object.  We might ascribe product value to trees, for example, because of the 
shade they provide, their critical role in the ecosystem, and so forth – none of which has 
anything to do with a creative process by which the trees came into existence.  But it would 
not follow that we would necessarily want more trees, or that more trees would make our 
lives go better.  Too many trees (which is not, alas, a problem we actually suffer from) 
might crowd out other forms of life, which themselves have product value, or occupy too 
much space, leaving us with no place to establish cities or to plant food for survival. 
83 Id. (manuscript at 124). 
84 Id. (manuscript at 129). 
85 DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 11 (“I shall try to convince you that most 
people accept [„the intrinsic and objective importance of how a human life is lived‟] on 
reflection . . . by persuading you that most people think it is intrinsically and objectively 
important how their own life is lived and then, second, that most people have no reason to 
think it is objectively any less important how anyone else‟s life is lived.”). 
86 To be clear, “syllogism” is my characterization.  Dworkin does not self-characterize 
the argument as a type of syllogism.  But I do not think it is an unfair characterization of the 
essential logic behind the two principles of human dignity, as set out in Democracy and, in 
greater detail, in Justice for Hedgehogs. 
87 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 129, 164).  To the 
same effect, Dworkin has argued elsewhere that we all think our own lives have “intrinsic” 
value and that if we accept this conviction relative to ourselves, “the equal objective 
importance of all human li[fe]” follows.  DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 11-16. 
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relies on a cognate syllogism.  It begins with our supposedly strong conviction 
that we each have a special, non-delegable responsibility to identify and pursue 
what counts for us as success in our lives.  It then asks (and answers in the 
negative) whether we have any reason to think that we alone have this 
responsibility.  For each of the principles, this syllogism strikes me as a non-
sequitur, and it seems to beg two questions. 
First, what is the justification for reliance on “convictions” or intuitions?  
Justice for Hedgehogs places significant, indeed decisive, weight on certain 
convictions in the context of the two principles.  Yet elsewhere Justice for 
Hedgehogs refers to convictions pejoratively or with scare quotes, presumably 
to indicate that, without reflection, we cannot accept them as reliable guides to 
truth.88  Few would disagree.  But that begs the question why we can rely on 
certain convictions – to the point of basing the most critical axioms by which 
we should live and treat others on them – while disdaining reliance on other 
convictions.  What, in other words, makes our shared convictions reliable as 
(indispensable) premises in the syllogisms that justify the two principles of 
human dignity – but unreliable in other contexts?  Justice for Hedgehogs does 
not, so far as I can tell, answer that question. 
Second, for both principles, it is not, I think, quite so self-evident that 
everyone shares them.  The claim that we share the convictions that justify the 
two principles of human dignity invites the question, “who is „we‟”?  Does 
Justice for Hedgehogs mean to argue that the two principles would be 
embraced by every human being, everywhere, at every time?  That is doubtful.  
The convictions that Justice for Hedgehogs says we share, might well be 
characteristic only of contemporary political liberals.89  Peoples acculturated 
elsewhere, and in traditions other than political liberalism, might not share 
them.  In the Hindu tradition, for example, it is traditionally thought that some 
people should accept their social position or caste and live a commensurate 
life, so that they may accrue positive karma and be reborn in progressively 
more felicitous circumstances and ultimately be in a position to achieve union 
with Brahman.  For a Hindu who believes this, it could be dangerous to 
 
88 Compare, e.g., DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 184) 
(disavowing the view that “our moral „intuitions‟ are guides to truth in some way at least 
analogous to perceptions of the world of nature”), with DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 
2, at 11-14 (scrutinizing the conviction that most of us think it important that our lives go 
well).  For analysis of the conviction that human life is sacred, see DWORKIN, LIFE‟S 
DOMINION, supra note 77, at 71-81. 
89 See, e.g., DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 15-16 (referring repeatedly to what 
most Americans “think” or “believe” or “would admit”); id. at 21 (“I hope you are now at 
least tempted to agree that Americans across the political spectrum, with relatively few 
exceptions, would accept that they share the conception of human dignity that I have been 
describing.” (emphasis added)).  The repeated references to Americans in Democracy may 
reflect only the focus of that book on political discourse in the United States.  If so, it is still 
a questionable leap of logic to go from what most Americans, in this day and age, think to 
what most human beings everywhere think. 
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embrace the second principle of human dignity, that is, to identify and pursue a 
self-created narrative by which he gives meaning to his life.  That self-
interested goal might lead to a less favorable rebirth. 
Of course, we can (and should) argue with such beliefs.  We might point 
out, for example, that, historically and anthropologically, the caste system 
developed as a method by which the Aryan invaders of the early Indus River 
Valley civilization created and preserved a system of social control.  Yet that is 
just to say that we can offer arguments in favor of the conviction underwriting 
the second principle.  (And I agree that we can and should.)  It is not to say, as 
Justice for Hedgehogs does, that each person, on sufficient reflection, would 
necessarily agree that he has a special, non-delegable responsibility to identify 
and pursue what counts as success for him in life. 
Finally, even if we assume that everyone, everywhere, at all times, does 
share the subjective conviction that, according to the first principle, his life has 
objective value, still, neither the truth of that conviction nor its equal 
application to all human beings follows logically.90  There might well be an 
evolutionary story to tell, for example, about why most of us tend to share the 
conviction that our lives objectively have intrinsic value.  Convictions report 
certain facts (about ourselves).  According to the naturalistic fallacy, what 
Dworkin calls “Hume‟s principle,”91 logic does not entitle us to infer truths 
about value from the existence of facts alone.  The mere fact, if it is a fact, of 
broadly shared, robust convictions about the objective importance of our lives, 
or our special responsibility for identifying and pursuing what matters to us, 
does not compel any conclusion about the objectivity of those convictions (as 
true values). 
Yet the preceding conclusion is indispensable to the account of human 
rights, among other issues, in Justice for Hedgehogs.  In order to do the 
theoretical work required of them in the realm of human rights, the principles 
of human dignity must be moral, not only ethical.  As Dworkin rightly 
emphasizes, there is an important distinction between the following two 
claims: first, the familiar claim, which he disavows, that each human being has 
intrinsic and equal worth; and second, the principle of self-respect: that “once a 
human life has begun, it matters how it goes.”92  A belief in the intrinsic and 
equal dignity or worth of all human beings is not the same – and does not have 
the same moral, legal, or political implications – as a belief that once a human 
life begins, it matters how that life goes.  Nor is the former belief equivalent to 
the second principle: that we all have a special, non-delegable responsibility to 
identify and pursue what counts for us as success in our lives. 
 
90 See DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 16. 
91 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 14). 
92 DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 9. 
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In Justice for Hedgehogs, however, as in Democracy, the two principles 
merge and together constitute one particular conception of human dignity.93  
That conception does not so obviously differ from the familiar claim that 
human beings have equal and intrinsic worth.  In his exposition of human 
rights in Democracy, for example, Dworkin explains that the first principle 
“declares the intrinsic and equal importance of every human life.”94  It is 
unclear precisely how this differs from “the familiar and popular claim that 
human beings have intrinsic and equal worth.”95  Perhaps Dworkin would 
reply that the first principle focuses on performance value (the adverbial value 
of living well) while the familiar claim focuses on product value (the inherent 
worth of human beings as corporeal entities).   
But if, as Dworkin and most others define them, human rights denote the 
rights that human beings have just because they are human, then only the 
familiar claim would support them.  Justice for Hedgehogs says, for example, 
that a state that discriminates based on race or practices gratuitous torture 
cannot plausibly “claim that it . . . embraces an intelligible conception of 
human dignity.”96  Most everyone would agree.  But the reason for their 
agreement would be a (tacit or explicit) background belief in inherent human 
dignity.  It would not be their commitment to the adverbial value of living well 
or to the responsibility of all human beings to identify and pursue a narrative 
that defines what counts as success in their lives.97  That may be why, even 
though Justice for Hedgehogs disavows the familiar claim that human beings 
have intrinsic and equal worth at one stage in the manuscript, it later advances 
(what appears to be) precisely that claim.  Reaffirming his views in Life’s 
Dominion, Dworkin writes in Justice for Hedgehogs that “human life is 
sacred” and that “the failure of any life is a waste of a cosmically valuable 
opportunity.”98  Perhaps that is so, but our intuition to that effect is a slender 
 
93 Justice for Hedgehogs often refers collectively to the two principles as “human 
dignity” or just to “dignity.”  E.g., DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 
(manuscript at 212). 
94 DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 37. 
95 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 129). 
96 Id. (manuscript at 212). 
97 That more familiar Kantian claim about the intrinsic and equal dignity of all human 
beings offers a plausible premise for the syllogism underlying the idea of human rights.  But 
even apart from Dworkin‟s disavowal of it, the proposition itself is no more than a dogmatic 
assertion and at best stands on shaky ground.  Michael Perry argues that there is no 
intelligible secular account of the idea that human being are innately sacred (or have equal 
dignity or worth).  MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11-41 
(1998).  I tend to agree, though for partially distinct reasons.  With particular reference to 
Dworkin‟s views, see PERRY, supra, at 25-29.  Dworkin rejects the view that religion can 
supply an adequate ground for his first principle, DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 
14-15, or for human rights, DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 
213-16).  
98 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 162). 
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reed on which to rest the two principles of human dignity and, as a 
consequence, a poor justification for international human rights. 
Michael Perry, among others, has critiqued secular accounts of innate 
human dignity, which are by no means unique to Dworkin.  According to 
Perry, the human rights syllogism – or the “idea” of human rights – has this 
underlying logical structure: 
According to the first part, each and every human being is sacred – each 
and every human being is “inviolable”, has “inherent dignity and worth”, 
is “an end in himself”, or the like.  According to the second part of the 
idea, because every human being is sacred (and given all other relevant 
information), certain choices should be made and certain other choices 
rejected; in particular, certain things ought not to be done to any human 
being and certain other things ought to be done for every human being.99 
Because Justice for Hedgehogs disavows the first part of this syllogism, that 
is, the claim that all human beings have intrinsic and equal worth, it may be a 
helpful thought experiment to consider the consequences of changing that part.  
Rather than make what Justice for Hedgehogs characterizes as the implausible 
or false claim that each human being has intrinsic and equal worth, we might 
substitute the principles of human dignity, self-respect, and authenticity: (1) 
once a life begins, it objectively matters how it goes; and (2) each person has a 
special, non-delegable responsibility to identify and pursue what counts for 
him as success in his life.  These two principles differ from the familiar claim 
in that neither makes any ontological assertion about the inherent value of 
human life.  Neither entails that human beings, just as human beings – and not 
in virtue of anything ascribed to them – have, in equal measure, an innate 
quality: sacredness, worth, dignity, inviolability, and so forth.  
The problem is that, absent this latter premise, the syllogism that Perry 
describes as “the idea of human rights” is pathological.  Accounts of human 
rights that derive from antecedent conceptions of human dignity, including 
Dworkin‟s, must posit innate human dignity or worth.  Only in that way can 
they introduce (one formulation of) Kant‟s categorical imperative: that human 
beings must be treated as ends in themselves and never only as means.100  But 
the two principles of human dignity, however attractive they might otherwise 
be, do not entail the categorical imperative or, for that matter, any 
deontological principle.  Nor can they be substituted for the familiar claim (that 
humans possess an innate human dignity in equal measure) as a means to 
rehabilitate the moral foundations of human rights.  For if human beings lack 
innate and equal dignity, if they need not always be treated as ends in 
themselves (and never only as a means), then, absent some further moral posit 
or argument, the two principles of human dignity do not exclude the kind of 
crude consequentialism that Dworkin elsewhere disavows.  It is not clear, for 
 
99 PERRY, supra note 97, at 4-5. 
100 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46 (Allen W. 
Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785).  
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example, why they would prohibit torturing the “ticking time-bomb terrorist,” 
given sufficient certainty about all of the contingencies that make this 
hypothetical situation so improbable and insidious in political discourse about 
torture.101  It is, after all, presumably more important, according to the first 
principle, that thousands of lives go well – indeed, that they just go (that is, 
that people survive) – than it is that one person‟s life go better (insofar as a life 
goes better if it does not include the experience of torture).  The need to avoid 
this kind of consequentialist reasoning may be why Justice for Hedgehogs 
tacitly reintroduces what looks like a metaphysical conception of innate human 
dignity.  That conception renders international human rights claims intelligible 
but at the – presumably unacceptable – cost of adopting a claim that Justice for 
Hedgehogs describes as either implausible or false. 
2. Rehabilitating International Human Rights 
An alternative to the human rights syllogism that Perry critiques begins with 
the concession that its first premise is false, or at least insusceptible to 
uncontroversial proof: that is, without resorting to inherently controversial 
dogmatic assertions, whether theological or secular in nature, we cannot make 
sense of the idea that human beings, just as human beings, possess an innate 
quality in equal measure that is properly described as dignity.  Dignity is a 
quality that human beings ascribe to other people or to their conduct.  But that 
“concession,” far from undermining human rights, goes a long way toward 
explaining why we need them.  
It is manifestly false that human beings always, or even often, act with 
dignity: human dignity is not a descriptive thesis.  To be sure, “[o]n occasion, 
men and women behave with inspiring dignity.  But that is not the same thing 
as saying that all human beings have an innate dignity or even a capacity to 
display it.”102  Often, we behave atrociously toward one another: 
The Holocaust showed up the terrible insufficiency of all the supposedly 
natural human attributes of pity and care in situations where these duties 
were no longer enforced by law.  Hannah Arendt argued in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism that when Jewish citizens of European states were 
deprived of their civil and political rights, when, finally, they had been 
stripped naked and could appeal to their captors only as plain, bare human 
beings, they found that even their nakedness did not awaken the pity of 
their tormenters.  As Arendt put it, “it seems that a man who is nothing 
 
101 See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 209).  On the 
“ticking time-bomb terrorist” hypothetical, see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM 
WORKS 131-63 (2002).  On the moral, legal, and pragmatic flaws in this hypothetical, see, 
for example, David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1425, 1427 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White 
House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1715 (2005). 
102 Ignatieff, supra note 7, at 54. 
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but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other 
people to treat him as a fellow man.”103 
That is, in a nutshell, the recognition that gave birth to the international 
human rights movement after World War II.  Efforts to justify human rights by 
reference to objective moral foundations, in contrast, yield unclear and 
inherently controversial views that prove ill-suited to a pluralistic world public 
order.  It is more constructive “to build support for human rights on the basis 
of what such rights actually do for human beings.  People may not agree why 
we have rights, but they can agree that we need them.”104 
The idea of human rights, in other words, is a moral and political posit 
rooted in history and prudence.  By positing human rights as the rights of all 
human beings, just as human beings, and by then seeking, first, to 
internationalize those rights in law, and second, to universalize them in 
morality,105 the postwar generation self-consciously sought to create and 
secure a particular conception of human dignity.  Where the post-World War I 
idea of minority rights had failed, the post-World War II generation hoped that 
the idea of universal human rights would succeed.  That is why, in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II, international human rights, “as 
inalienable and undifferentiated rights that attach to the individual without 
regard to cultural identity, found widespread support,”106 even though such 
rights, empirically, lacked (and continue to lack) a universal, cross-cultural 
moral foundation as a descriptive matter.107  
The drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights understood this, 
and deliberately eschewed moral foundations.  Jacques Maritain, one of the 
members of the drafting committee, responded to “astonishment that certain 
champions of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of . . . rights,” 
by stressing that the committee could agree, to be sure – but only “on condition 
that no one asks us why.”108  Rather than try to derive human rights from 
“violently opposed” moral and ideological foundations, the drafters therefore 
conceived of human rights as the minimal conditions needed for human beings 
to live a life of dignity as defined by the core among the diversity of 
ideologies, beliefs, and values represented on the drafting committee.109  As 
the U.N. General Assembly put it in 1950, human rights define “the human 
 
103 Id. at 79 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 80 (“We defend human rights as moral 
universals in full awareness that they must counteract rather than reflect natural human 
propensities.”). 
104 Id. at 54-55. 
105 See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 17. 
106 Sloane, supra note 12, at 548. 
107 See id. at 550. 
108 Jacques Maritain, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
9 (UNESCO ed. 1949). 
109 This core is “bounded,” to be sure, but nonetheless meaningful.  See DONNELLY, 
supra note 4, at 51-53. 
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person whom the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] regards as the ideal 
of the free man.”110  Historically, in short, human rights defined human dignity 
– not vice versa.111  The same approach, in contrast to moral foundationalism, 
remains compelling today. 
Dworkin seems to reject this view because, as he writes in Justice for 
Hedgehogs, it “does not redeem the phenomenology that inspires it . . . .  We 
do create our lives, but we do it aiming at value, not trying to invent it.  We 
cannot avoid the conviction of value independent of our will or fiat.”112  In 
fact, this contention – that “[w]e cannot avoid the conviction of value 
independent of our will or fiat” – is not self-evident, still less a conviction that 
we cannot avoid: “The notion that something is valuable independently of a 
beneficial relation to anyone or anything . . . is perfectly opaque.”113  Value 
 
110 G.A. Res. 421, ¶ E, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 4, 
1950).  Although the UDHR rhetorically recognizes “the inherent dignity” of all persons, it 
avoids explaining the source of that dignity, except to say, in words redolent of Ignatieff‟s 
view, that “disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which 
have outraged the conscience of mankind.”  UDHR, supra note 39, at 71.  History shows, in 
other words, that the absence of human rights threatens human dignity. 
111 See Ignatieff, supra note 7, at 83 (“All that can be said about human rights is that they 
are necessary to protect individuals from violence and abuse, and if it is asked why, the only 
possible answer is historical.”). 
112 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 136) (emphasis 
added). 
 Parenthetically, the mere fact that we cannot avoid a conviction does not necessarily 
mean it is true.  We cannot avoid the perception and consequent conviction of a world 
characterized by time and extension (space).  But that does not make our convictions about 
time and space true, as Albert Einstein suggested and modern quantum physics seems to 
corroborate.  In a similar vein, Dworkin argues that we should reject a naturalistic account 
of free will and causation because it can only be redeemed [in the „physical and biological 
world‟].”  Id. at 145.  He worries that “once we do [adopt the naturalistic account of 
causation,] the hope [that we have free will] becomes vulnerable to scientific discovery or 
metaphysical speculation.”  Id.  Yet the possibility that science might dash our hope that we 
have free will in a naturalistic sense offers no reason to abandon the naturalistic account of 
freedom of the will.  It would be methodologically repugnant to adopt a particular view of 
free will precisely in an effort to insulate that view from scientific truth.  Cf. LEITER, supra 
note 14, at 238 (“Science has earned its claim to be a guide to the real and the unreal by 
depopulating our world of gods and witches and ethers, and substituting a picture of the 
world and how it works of immense practical value.”).   
Above, I say Dworkin “seems” to reject this view in the text because elsewhere in the 
manuscript, Dworkin locates human dignity in “the fact of our consciousness and the 
phenomenal world of challenge it offers – the challenge of lives to lead and thousands of 
decisions to make,” which “itself gives us all the dignity we need or should crave.”  Id. at 
145; see also DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 15 (“It [„your having a good life‟] is 
important for no further reason than that you have a life to live.”).  This strikes me as 
difficult to distinguish from the view quoted in the text, which Dworkin explicitly rejects. 
113 PERRY, supra note 97, at 26. 
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may be intrinsic (in the sense that we seek it for its own sake), or value may be 
instrumental (in the sense that we seek it, not for its own sake, but because it 
facilitates or helps us to realize a further, intrinsically valuable objective).  But 
there is no coherent notion of value without an evaluator.114 
Yet nothing about the validity or normative force of human rights need 
depend on resolving esoteric debates in metaphysics or metaethics (or even on 
the intelligibility of inquiry into these “meta” fields, which Justice for 
Hedgehogs characterizes as incoherent).  While Perry may well be correct that 
the idea of innate human dignity (apart from what we ascribe) lacks an 
intelligible secular basis, it does not necessarily follow that the distinct idea of 
human rights is religious.  Perry writes: “The conviction that every human 
being is sacred is, in my view, inescapably religious – and the idea of human 
rights, therefore, ineliminably religious.”115  But logic does not compel the 
“therefore” unless human rights can only be justified on the basis of some 
antecedent view about human dignity.  That is not the case. 
The absence of an objective, secular basis for the belief that human life is 
sacred could, of course, lead to the Benthamite conclusion that human rights 
(like all rights) amount to “nonsense upon stilts.”116  But it could also lead us 
to inquire into the sociopolitical, historical, and phenomenological origins of 
human rights, which are, after all, a peculiarly modern invention.  Before 1945, 
and for the most part before World War II, human rights existed, if at all, only 
in theological writings and international rhetoric.117  In law, international 
human rights were self-consciously created in response to the atrocities of Nazi 
Germany, the perceived failure of prewar minority-rights regimes, and other 
comparatively recent historical events.118  
Justice for Hedgehogs defends the unity and objectivity of value, and it is 
therefore understandable for the manuscript to locate human, like political and 
legal, rights in an antecedent conception of human dignity based on an 
avowedly objective morality.119  This approach also, concededly, aptly 
captures the characteristic rhetoric of international human rights instruments.120  
 
114 See id. 
115 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
116 JEREMY BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLACIES 489, 501 (1824). 
117 See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of “Western” 
Universalism, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 60, 62-69 (Joanne R. 
Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999).  Slavery may be an exception.  See Jenny S. Martinez, 
Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550, 
552 (2008) (observing that international antislavery courts established between 1817 and 
1871 “were the first international human rights courts”). 
118 Sloane, supra note 12, at 548. 
119 Cf. DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 210) (“Dignity 
is . . . the foundation of all political rights.”). 
120 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; UDHR, supra note 39, at 71 (recognizing 
“the inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
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But as I have briefly suggested, it reverses matters: we need human rights 
because there is no objective, uncontroversial basis for the belief that human 
beings, just as human beings, possess in equal measure an innate quality, 
dignity, that compels respect from those with power, typically state officials – 
but, in the modern era, also private armies, clans, militias, and other non-state 
actors.  “We defend human rights as moral universals in full awareness that 
they must counteract rather than reflect natural human propensities.”121 
An indispensable premise of this alternative approach to human rights, 
however, is the fact of value pluralism.  In previous work, I tried to defend the 
normative universality of international human rights against cultural relativism 
based on traditional liberal views, including value pluralism.122  By appealing 
to the fact of value pluralism and its analogue at the international level, cultural 
pluralism,123 as well as its traditional corollaries in the liberal tradition – 
reasonable tolerance, a political conception of the self as an agent, and the 
imperative to afford all people genuine, informed autonomy – I argued, in part, 
that cultural relativists cannot object to the “imposition” of universal human 
rights while simultaneously insisting on international tolerance of practices that 
offend those rights: international tolerance, in other words, of intolerance.  
Paradoxical though it may seem at first blush, international human rights law 
merits universal allegiance because it “is animated by the distinctively liberal 
presumption of reasonable value pluralism.”124  The Western focus on the 
individual that is evident in the concept of human rights – as well as the 
possibility, and even desirability, of competing conceptions of the good – is 
not a matter for apology.125  
I will not reiterate these arguments, but in the context of this Essay, it is 
necessary to defend their premise: the empirical fact of value pluralism.  For as 
 
family”); World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) (“Recognizing 
and affirming that all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human 
person . . .”). 
121 Ignatieff, supra note 7, at 80. 
122 Sloane, supra note 12, at 587-92. 
123 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1st paperback ed. 2001) 
(“In the Society of Peoples, the parallel to reasonable pluralism is the diversity among 
reasonable peoples with their different cultures and traditions of thought, both religious and 
nonreligious.”). 
124 Sloane, supra note 12, at 592.  Value monism, in contrast, must insist that all values 
can be harmoniously reconciled; “it cannot accommodate fundamentally divergent basic 
models and values capable of irreconcilable conflict.”  Avery Plaw, Why Monist Critiques 
Feed Value Pluralism: Ronald Dworkin’s Critique of Isaiah Berlin, 30 SOC. THEORY & 
PRAC. 105, 106 (2004). 
125 Ignatieff, supra note 7, at 74-75 (“There is no reason to apologize for the moral 
individualism at the heart of human rights discourse: it is precisely this that makes it 
attractive to dependent groups suffering exploitation or oppression.”); see also HENKIN, 
supra note 3, at xi; cf. Donnelly, supra note 117, at 77-78. 
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the ancient metaphor about the fox and the hedgehog that inspired the 
manuscript‟s title implies, Justice for Hedgehogs is in one sense an extended 
argument against value pluralism. 
II. VALUE PLURALISM AND THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVITY 
Value pluralism animates much of the most influential work in modern 
liberal political and legal thought.  It is the paramount reason that John Rawls 
found his initial and hugely influential thesis in A Theory of Justice126 
unsatisfactory.127  It is also, as especially relevant in the context of this Essay, 
the assumption on the basis of which he later sought to develop an account of 
justice appropriate for international law.128  While value pluralism plays a 
particularly prominent role in Rawls‟s views, its influence is not, of course, so 
limited.  Most other liberal theorists share this presumption.  In fact, it is 
probably not an overstatement to say that “liberal theories presuppose . . . 
reasonable value pluralism, the assumption that individuals reasonably 
conceive different and conflicting values.”129  Dworkin, as a liberal theorist 
who insists on value monism, is a rare exception in this regard. 
Value pluralism has prominent antecedents in political thought.130  But it 
owes its postwar grip on liberal theory to one philosopher more than any other: 
Isaiah Berlin.  Berlin‟s views have therefore been a frequent target of 
Dworkin‟s work, not only in Justice for Hedgehogs, which takes its title from 
one of Berlin‟s essays,131 but throughout Dworkin‟s career.132  As early as 
 
126 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
127 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xvii (1993) (“The fact of a plurality of 
reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines – the fact of reasonable pluralism – 
shows that, as used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness is 
unrealistic.”); see also id. at 36 (“[T]he diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a mere 
historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture 
of democracy.”). 
128 See RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 123, at 11-12. 
129 DAVID JOHNSTON, THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL THEORY 26 (1994) (emphasis omitted). 
130 For example, in the Federalist Papers, James Madison ascribed the inevitability of 
factions within free polities to value pluralism, which he saw as the natural consequence of 
man‟s self-love, passions, the fallibility of his reason, and a consequent “zeal for different 
opinions concerning religion, concerning Government and many other points.”  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58-59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  In the 
nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill located value pluralism at the center of the proper 
conception of the nature and limits of political freedom in a true liberal polity.  See JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11-12 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859). 
131 See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 1 (1953) (“There is a line among the 
fragments of the Greek poet Archilochus which says: „The fox knows many things, but the 
hedgehog knows one big thing.‟” (citation omitted)). 
132 For an early critique, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 268-72 
(1977); for a more recent critique, see DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 10, at 105-
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Taking Rights Seriously and continuing to the present in Justice for 
Hedgehogs, Dworkin has argued that Berlin made a fundamental mistake: he 
thought that equally laudable or worthy values embraced by liberal polities 
would necessarily, at times, conflict, and that, in the case of at least some 
conflicts, polities would therefore need to engage in political sacrifices and 
compromises.  Resolving value conflicts would be necessary, but sometimes 
they would also be tragic or regrettable at some level.  Dworkin‟s view, to the 
contrary, is that the realm of value is objective and unified such that, properly 
defined and construed, all values – including those that underwrite human 
rights – inform and reinforce one another.133  Perhaps that is so, although the 
argument to this effect in Justice for Hedgehogs does not strike me as 
persuasive.  But for international human rights, this particular argument against 
value pluralism is beside the point.  
The fact of value pluralism, as the designation “fact” suggests, is an 
empirical, not a metaphysical, ontological, or interpretive proposition.134  It is 
principally a descriptive thesis, that is, not a normative one.135  Whether 
Dworkin regards it in this way is unclear.  Justice for Hedgehogs does, of 
course, seek to defend the unity and objectivity of value against various forms 
of relativism and pluralism: it seeks to defend the hedgehog against many 
different foxes.136  But Dworkin has made clear elsewhere that he does not 
deny the clear empirical fact of moral and cultural diversity: values vary as 
between cultures,137 societies, epochs, polities, and people.138  Indeed, he has 
expressed impatience in this regard with the failure of his perennial critic, 
Judge Richard Posner, to heed the distinction between issues of moral 
philosophy, on the one hand, and those of moral sociology, anthropology, or 
psychology, on the other: “Do the „academic moralists‟ on [Judge Posner‟s] hit 
list really need to be told, or told so often, that societies, subcultures, and 
individuals have different moral opinions?  Or that a warthog, if capable of 
such thoughts, might think another warthog beautiful?”139  In short, Dworkin 
 
16.  See also Ronald Dworkin, Do Liberal Values Conflict?, in THE LEGACY OF ISAIAH 
BERLIN 73 (2001) (discussing Isaiah Berlin‟s “ideas [about value pluralism] as a distinct and 
important philosophical contribution, particularly to political philosophy”). 
133 See DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 10-11. 
134 See generally John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 223 (1985) (arguing that his conception of justice – which requires diversity 
and plurality – is independent of philosophical and religious doctrines). 
135  Plaw, supra note 124, at 106.  Berlin apparently also believed in the normative value 
of value pluralism (in contradistinction to value monism), see id. at 120-23, but for present 
purposes, that thesis is immaterial; and, at any rate, there is no evidence that Berlin believed 
in the metaphysically objective truth of any value, including the normative value of value 
pluralism. 
136 See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7). 
137 See supra note 17. 
138 See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 10, at 76-78. 
139 Id. at 77-78. 
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has rightly stressed that we must distinguish questions of morality from 
questions about morality.140  He has said that it would be a logical error – a 
paradigm of the naturalistic fallacy – to infer from an anthropological 
platitude, the fact of value pluralism, the moral conclusion that no value can be 
objectively true or more persuasively justified than any other.141 
Yet it is not apparent that Berlin drew this inference or that he regarded 
value pluralism as an ontological or metaphysical, as opposed to merely an 
empirical, proposition.  Dworkin describes Berlin‟s view as “more complex 
and interesting” than the preceding anthropological platitude – which 
everyone, himself included, recognizes – because, he says, Berlin “believed 
that values are indeed objective.”142  He infers this from Berlin‟s statement that 
values may clash “within the breast of a single individual.”143  This statement 
does not, I think, necessarily establish that Berlin believed in the objectivity of 
value.  That values may clash “within the breast of a single individual” might 
imply the objectivity of value, but it might also suggest our epistemic or 
cognitive limits. 
In Two Concepts of Liberty, after critiquing “rationalist metaphysician[s]” 
like Plato, Hegel, and Marx, Berlin writes: 
if we are not armed with an a priori guarantee of the proposition that a 
total harmony of true values is somewhere to be found – perhaps in some 
ideal realm the characteristics of which we can, in our finite state, not so 
much as conceive – we must fall back on the ordinary resources of 
empirical observation and ordinary human knowledge.  And these 
certainly give us no warrant for supposing (or even understanding what 
would be meant by saying) that all good things, or all bad things for that 
matter, are reconcilable with each other.144  
Berlin concludes that “the very desire for guarantees that our values are eternal 
and secure in some objective heaven is perhaps only a craving for the 
certainties of childhood or the absolute values of our primitive past.”145  It is 
hard to construe these and similar statements, which abound in his work, to 
affirm the objectivity of value in any ontological or interpretive sense.  
According to one Berlin scholar‟s analysis, Berlin “oscillates between the 
 
140 See id. at 77. 
141 See id. at 78, 107. 
142 Id. at 107; see also id. (“Berlin did not just insist, as so many writers now do, on the 
anthropological platitude that different societies are organized around very different 
values . . . .  Nor does he simply combine that platitude with the further skeptical claim that 
it makes no sense to speak of „objective‟ values at all.”). 
143 ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: 
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 12-13 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990); see also DWORKIN, 
JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 10, at 107. 
144 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 213 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) 
(emphasis added). 
145 Id. at 217. 
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subjectivist [position, which „holds that values are merely constructs of the 
human mind‟] and the realist position.”146  But Berlin‟s insistence on a 
particular definition of liberty, “negative freedom,” as “the area within which a 
man can act unobstructed by others,”147 is best understood as insistence on 
precision in language and meaning,148 not as an assertion that this definition of 
liberty is objective in either a naturalistic or interpretive sense. 
What Berlin himself thought, however, is a peripheral academic debate.  
The real question is how or why the objectivity of value even matters in the 
domain of international human rights, for absent a shared epistemology of 
value, the objectivity of values is irrelevant to the political implications that 
Berlin and other liberal political theorists have inferred from the empirical fact 
of value pluralism.  Whatever else may be said about the “equilibrium 
epistemology of value”149 proposed in Justice for Hedgehogs, it is neither easy 
to apply nor broadly shared.  Quite the contrary: it is idiosyncratic.  It also 
demands a kind of intellectual labor and idealistic Socratic reflection, which, 
certainly within the framework of international law and politics, seems 
quixotic.  Jeremy Waldron has argued in a cognate context that for the 
objectivity vel non of value even to be relevant to adjudication, we would need 
a broadly shared epistemology of value comparable to the one that exists in the 
realm of the natural sciences.150 
In politics, morality, ethics, and law – and a fortiori in international law, 
which must handle value conflicts, not only within a polity, but among some 
195 or more diverse polities – the force of Berlin‟s fundamental point about the 
inevitability of genuine value conflicts is left intact in the absence of a shared 
epistemology.  Even if, in theory, all values can be reconciled within a polity 
(through an interpretive discourse whereby citizens work out the best 
conception of each value), the empirical fact of value pluralism would remain 
unaffected; and that is the critical issue for a functional conception of 
international human rights.  Although Justice for Hedgehogs generally rejects 
value pluralism, its conception of international human rights, not 
coincidentally, accommodates the empirical fact of value pluralism.  It permits 
 
146 CONNIE AARSBERGEN-LIGTVOET, ISAIAH BERLIN: A VALUE PLURALIST AND HUMANIST 
VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 4 (2006).  True, Berlin says, “There is a 
world of objective values.”  BERLIN, supra note 143, at 11.  But this is a case of imprecise 
word choice and a quotation taken out of context.  By restoring the context, it is 
unmistakably clear that Berlin does not mean values exist in some ontological or 
metaphysical sense.  In the very next sentence, he says that by “objective values,” he means 
“those ends that men pursue for their own sakes, to which other things are means.”  Id.  This 
is a description of intrinsic values, not objective values in the sense Dworkin has in mind. 
147 Berlin, supra note 144, at 169.  
148 See id. at 170 (“This [definition of freedom] is what the classical English political 
philosophers meant when they used the word.”). 
149 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 260). 
150 See Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 
170, 173-75 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
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reasonable, good-faith disagreements, within some margin of appreciation, 
about how concrete human rights should be understood and applied in different 
polities.151  That is unsurprising.  The second principle of human dignity tells 
each person to identify and pursue what counts as success in his or her life.152  
As a social, anthropological, or psychological matter, the answer to this 
question will differ from person to person, culture to culture, epoch to epoch, 
and so forth.  A laudable feature of the idea of human rights is that it does not 
insist on a single vision of what qualifies as success – or, in the lexicon of 
modern liberal political theory, a single “conception of the good.”153  
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
A final critique of the account of human rights in Justice for Hedgehogs will 
be familiar, even banal, to many contemporary international lawyers.  But it 
bears emphasis because it reflects, I think, a general misconception in the 
manuscript about the nature and enforcement of human rights.  Justice for 
Hedgehogs argues that human, like political and legal, rights operate as 
“trumps over some background justification for political decisions that states a 
goal for the community as a whole.”154  It distinguishes human rights from 
political rights, not only in terms of their degree of abstraction, but in that they 
“do not merely trump collective goals.  They also trump another principle 
prominent in international law: sovereignty.”155  Dworkin seems to have in 
mind the rare circumstances in which widespread or systematic human rights 
atrocities, such as a genocide, arguably justify humanitarian intervention.156  
That is a small, and deeply controversial, part of the law and morality of 
human rights.  
Still, in this and other passages, Dworkin associates the violation of human 
rights with a right of military intervention.  He is correct, of course, to say that 
it would be absurd “to suppose that the . . . United Nations might authorize an 
invasion of America to install a government that would provide universal 
health care there or an invasion of Germany to free prisoners convicted of 
denying that the Holocaust took place.”157  Such absurdities, I think, in part 
animate his conception of international human rights as requiring only a good-
faith interpretation of the two principles of human dignity; otherwise, military 
intervention to halt or remedy human rights violations would seem to be 
 
151 See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 215). 
152 See id. (manuscript at 11). 
153 See supra text accompany notes 115-125. 
154 Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 153 (Jeremy 
Waldron ed., 1984). 
155 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1 (manuscript at 211). 
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those in their power, then other nations are permitted to attempt to stop them if other 
conditions are met.”). 
157 Id. 
  
132 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:ppp 
 
authorized (at least morally) quite often.  But this line of argument betrays a 
misconception about human rights: while severe and systematic, human rights 
abuses may justify humanitarian intervention (morally, if not necessarily 
legally), the mark of a human right is certainly not whether its violation 
confers on other states, or a coalition of them, a legal right to coerce 
compliance by violence.  Force is a small part of human rights enforcement. 
In fact, the best guarantee of human rights is not international law and 
institutions; it is a well-functioning state, that is, the modern “sovereign” 
itself.158  To similar effect, Louis Henkin wrote that 
[i]n the ideology of rights, human rights are [“upon society,”] not “against 
society,” against the interest of society; on the contrary, the good society 
is one in which individual rights flourish, and the promotion and 
protection of every individual‟s rights are a public good.  There is an aura 
of conflict between individual and society only in that individual rights 
are asserted against government, against those who represent society 
officially, and because the human rights idea often requires that an 
individual‟s rights be preferred to some other public good.  But this 
apparent conflict between individual and society is specious; in the 
longer, deeper view, the society is better if the individual‟s rights are 
respected.159 
After World War II, international law reconceptualized sovereignty: 
“International law still protects sovereignty, but – not surprisingly – it is the 
people‟s sovereignty rather than the sovereign‟s sovereignty.”160  I will not 
belabor this point, which has been debated elsewhere,161 except to say that the 
conceptual conflict Justice for Hedgehogs posits between sovereignty and 
human rights, whereby human rights must sometimes trump sovereignty, 
seems not only anachronistic, but incongruous in the context of the manuscript 
as a whole.  The gravamen of the argument in Justice for Hedgehogs is the 
unity of value.162  Hence, for example, liberty and equality, according to 
 
158 See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, WHOSE UNIVERSAL VALUES?  THE CRISIS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
19 (1999). 
159 HENKIN, supra note 3, at 5. 
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Justice for Hedgehogs, would best be defined such that each informs and 
circumscribes the other – and similarly with other presumed conflicts of value, 
such as the idea that constitutional rights in the United States should be 
conceived as trumps on majority rule, which, while perhaps necessary, often 
impose a moral cost to democratic values that must be regarded as regrettable 
in a certain sense.163  In Freedom’s Law, as in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin 
rejects that view, arguing that constitutional rights reinforce rather than conflict 
with core democratic values, properly understood.  Why, then, when it comes 
to the concepts of sovereignty and human rights, as objective ideals, does 
Justice for Hedgehogs see a conflict requiring the latter to trump the former? 
CONCLUSION 
In the course of defending the normative universality of international human 
rights law in earlier work, I wrote that 
[w]e live in a world, not of competing relativisms – “these values embody 
the good for a circumscribed set of persons leading lives in this particular 
cultural context” – but of competing universalisms – “these values 
embody the good.”  Paradoxically, then, the feature of comprehensive 
“conceptions of the good” that proves most adverse to an international 
order structured by respect for universal human rights is dogmatic 
universalism – the claim that one system of values prescribes what “is 
right” for everyone and can therefore be justifiably imposed, through 
violence if necessary, on others.164 
In other words, at an abstract level, it is value monism, not value pluralism, 
that poses the greater threat to human rights.  If that is so, however, and if 
Justice for Hedgehogs defends value monism (the unity and objectivity of 
value), why does its account capture many of our basic intuitions about human 
rights? 
The answer, I think, is that the two principles of human dignity posited in 
Justice for Hedgehogs aptly capture core ideas in the liberal political tradition.  
The first principle, self-respect, essentially affirms one formulation of Kant‟s 
categorical imperative: to say that it is a matter of objective and intrinsic 
importance that each human life go well is one way of expressing the view that 
human life must always be treated as an end in itself and never as a means 
only.165  The second principle, authenticity, essentially affirms the liberal 
conception of the self: to say that all human beings have a special, non-
delegable responsibility to identify and pursue what counts as success in their 
lives is to affirm, among other things, the traditional liberal conception of the 
self as, to quote Robert Nozick‟s summary, “sentient and self-conscious; 
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rational (capable of using abstract concepts, not tied to responses to immediate 
stimuli); possessing free will; being a moral agent capable of guiding its 
behavior by moral principles” and therefore an agent that is able “to regulate 
and guide its life in accordance with some overall conception it chooses to 
accept.”166  Compare this to the view expressed in Justice for Hedgehogs that 
human dignity resides in “the challenge of lives to lead and thousands of 
unscripted decisions to make . . . .  [W]e must struggle to choose and we can 
create value – the adverbial value of living well – through our choices.”167  
In short, Dworkin‟s account of the moral foundations of human rights offers 
an apt and succinct way to capture some of our (where “our” refers to 
contemporary political liberals) core intuitions about human rights.  But the 
reason is not that the two principles of human dignity in Hedgehogs describe 
objective values; it is that they reflect a politically defensible liberal tradition.  
That tradition includes recognition of the fact of value pluralism, a conception 
of the self as an agent, a stress on choice as the vehicle by which human beings 
invest their lives with value, and therefore a commitment to reasonable 
tolerance of diverse conceptions of the good. 
Many of the worst human rights tragedies in modernity – from the 
Holocaust to Stalin‟s purges to Pol Pot‟s Cambodia to ethnic cleansing in the 
former Yugoslavia to the Rwandan genocide to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 – have been carried out by those who thought they knew, 
like the metaphorical hedgehog, “one big thing” that tied together all 
seemingly discordant values.  As Berlin wrote in a famous passage:  
One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of 
individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals – justice or progress 
or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred mission or 
emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself, which 
demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of society.  This is 
the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation 
or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history 
or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a 
final solution.  This ancient faith rests on the conviction that all the 
positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be 
compatible, and perhaps even entail one another.168 
I emphatically do not mean to suggest that Dworkin‟s particular version of 
value monism – which embraces and, in the second principle of human dignity, 
even, in a particular sense, encourages value pluralism – belongs in this 
company.  But it is far from clear that, as he asserts in Justice in Robes, value 
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pluralists have been responsible for human rights atrocities as often as have the 
value monists against whom Berlin warned.169  
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